As Zimbabwe grapples with its multiple challenges, it is important to take a step back and look at the bigger picture – to map the future it helps to understand where the country is coming from. This article gives a panoramic view of some of the key moments that have shaped politics in Zimbabwe since independence. It is by no means an exhaustive list. When I started, I intended to identify just five of what I regard as landmark moments, but as soon as I began this exercise a few weeks ago, I realised a list of five would both be too limiting and too limited. But even now, I’m alive to the fact the current list may have omitted some things that others regard as having more defining and deserving of a place in the analysis. But having notched more than 7,000 words, the piece is already carrying a heavy load. This paper captures those moments, events and processes, which I believe have had a fundamental impact on post-independence politics in Zimbabwe. The primary target of this article is the younger generation of Zimbabweans and newcomers to politics in Zimbabwe. Those of my generation or older might find it all too obvious, because these are things we grew up reading and observing in the 1980s and 1990s. But to a younger generation, they are probably new and might help them get a broader sense of the things that have shaped their country over the years – where we went wrong and perhaps where we got it right.
I worry when I meet and talk to a younger generation of Zimbabweans who seem completely unaware of some events and processes which are commonplace to those of my generation. Yet all I can do in this limited space is to give brief summaries, hoping that readers can use the pointers to do further reading. Thankfully,there is growing body of literature that deals with these issues.
Independence
Naturally, the occasion of independence from colonial rule has to be the starting point. Independence arrived on 18th April 1980 and it was a seminal moment. The new Zimbabwe that emerged in 1980 was a product of a bitter armed struggle between the nationalists and the white minority regime. The attainment of independence completed a political revolution which replaced a system of white minority rule with black majority rule. Although the armed struggle provided a major push towards the achievement of independence, in the end, the result was a product of political compromise, negotiated at Lancaster House Constitutional Conference held in London between September and December 1979. The conference resulted in a ceasefire agreement and a new draft constitution which was adopted at independence.
It is a landmark moment because independence provided the foundation for the new Zimbabwean state. However, the fact that it was a political compromise meant there were a number of issues that remained unresolved. These issues, such as the contentious land question, were only postponed to a later date. In addition, independence changed the political leaders but the systems and laws used by the colonial regime did not change. Thus the coercive apparatus of the state remained largely intact and was later used to great effect by the new independence regime. Far from bringing in vast changes, the retention of the colonial structures at independence had guaranteed continuity. Nevertheless, the euphoria of independence and the promises of reconciliation presented a rosy picture that seemed more promising.
1980 Elections
With the passage of time, it is sometimes easy to overlook the sheer significance of that moment in 1980, when Zimbabweans of all races went to the polls for the first time in a democratic and legitimate election. Elections were held over 3 days between 27 and 29 February 1980. There were two rolls, the White Roll, for the white minority who were entitled to 20 seats and the Common Roll, for everyone else, where they competed for 80 seats. It was a small parliament: the House of Assembly had just 100 MPs and the Senate had 40 seats. This racial division of voting rolls was part of the political compromise reached at the Lancaster House conference. It was an electoral system designed to assuage the fears of the white minority, which was losing political power to the black majority after 90 years of exclusive control of the state.
The main candidates on the Common Roll were Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Muzorewa, who had led the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government in 1979 was considered a favourite due to his proximity to the state. There had been an expectation that Mugabe and Nkomo would contest together, under the banner of the Patriotic Front, but this did not happen. In the end, Mugabe confounded doubters when his romped to victory, taking 57 seats. Nkomo won 20 seats and Muzorewa managed a paltry 3 seats. The Rhodesia Front won all the 20 seats on the White Roll. The election was not perfect but it was declared legitimate.
On 4 March 1980, Mugabe was declared the winner of the elections and given authority to form government. While the magnitude of Mugabe’s victory shocked his critics and appalled his opponents, the speech that he delivered on 4 March 1980 was a pleasant surprise. The world celebrates Nelson Mandela for his policy of reconciliation when South Africa gained freedom in 1994, but actually, it was Mugabe who set the precedent in the region in that famous speech on 4 March 1980. In a remarkable show of magnanimity, Mugabe announced a policy of reconciliation, exhorting Zimbabweans of all races to forget their past differences and instead to forge ahead together into the future. “Let us turn our swords into ploughshares,” he said to great acclaim. This speech was well received, particularly among the white minority, who had been apprehensive about his victory. It may have persuaded some white Zimbabweans to remain at a time when they were considering leaving like others had already done.
History tells us Mugabe would change his tune in later years, publicly lashing out at whites in the post-2000 period, but the 1980 reconciliation speech played an important role in ensuring a smoother transition from the colonial regime to Zimbabwe. It was the policy of reconciliation that set the tone for the sensitive task of integrating the different armies and other units of the state. In the early years, senior white officers retained their positions, in the military, police, civil service, the judiciary and both business and farming were left untouched. This ensured a quieter, more peaceful, if deceptive, transition.
Gukurahundi (1982-87)
An otherwise innocent term, Gukurahundi which refers to the rain which washes away the chaff after the harvest, is now synonymous with the dark and sinister world of atrocities. It represents a military operation carried out by the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland and the Midlands under the guise of fighting armed dissidents. While there was a dissident problem, the response was excessive and disproportionate to the threat. It became a cover for the massacre of thousands of innocent civilians and the destruction of property and livelihoods. A report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), which carried out extensive research on Gukurahundi estimates that up to 20,000 civilians were killed. Another report by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights carries detailed narratives of the atrocities. It was during this time that ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo was forced to flee the country in 1983, citing threats to his life. Gukurahundi was brought to an end in 1987 after an agreement between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU – the Unity Accord.
Nevertheless, Gukurahundi left a huge wound that is yet to heal. While Mugabe has referred to it as a “moment of madness”, the government has never taken responsibility for the atrocities. The failure to resolve this important issue continues to haunt Zimbabwe. Gukurahundi set the regions back in terms of development many years as social facilities and infrastructure were destroyed. It is argued that Gukurahundi was not just the physical attacks upon the people, but was in the form of policies which marginalised the affected regions and people. Up to now, children of parents who were killed during Gukurahundi have struggled to claim and assert their identity as they cannot get birth certificates. There are still no death certificates for their slain fathers.
The ghost of Gukurahundi continues to haunt Zimbabwe and will haunt future governments unless decisive and clear steps are taken to find closure. Sweeping it under the carpet, treating it as having been resolved by the political leaders’ agreement in 1987 is a big error of judgment. One of the great failures of the international community is that it stood by and did nothing to stop the new Zimbabwean regime from committing these atrocities, even though they were aware of what was happening. Instead, the West lauded Mugabe as a progressive leader.
Unity Accord
The Unity Accord is the agreement reached between Mugabe’s Zanu PF and Nkomo’s PF Zapu on 22 December 1987 after protracted negotiations. This inter-party political agreement is now commemorated as a national holiday. The significance of the Unity Accord is on a number of levels. First, it brought an end to the atrocities in Matabeleland and the Midlands, carried out by the Fifth Brigade. It also ended the menace posed by the small band of dissidents. Second, the Unity Accord cemented a culture of impunity as it came with guarantees of immunity for members of the security services and the dissidents. It meant those who had committed atrocities were amnestied. This strategy, which had been used after the war in 1980, was later repeated several times, encouraging violence and impunity. Third, the Unity Accord brought the country closer to a one-party state system of government as the dominant ZANU PF virtually swallowed Nkomo’s PF ZAPU. The political competition between the two major parties came to an end. The resulting entity, ZANU PF was a political behemoth which went on to dominate political space for more than a decade until the emergence of the MDC in 1999. Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement provided an important check upon ZANU PF’s drive towards forming a one party state, but it quickly fizzled out after the 1990 elections.
We will never know what might have happened had the Unity Accord never happened but likely the atrocities and suffering in Matabeleland and the Midlands would have persisted. Nkomo’s decision to joining his party with ZANU PF was an important act of political sacrifice aimed at saving the lives of the people.
Constitutional Amendment No. 7 of 1987
This was the most fundamental amendment to the Lancaster House Constitution which had been agreed in 1979. It completely transformed the structure and system of government in Zimbabwe, creating an all-powerful Executive President. The Lancaster House Constitution created a system of government modelled along the Westminster system in Britain, with a ceremonial President and an executive Prime Minister. Voters elected MPs and leader of the party with the majority of seats formed government. The Prime Minister was the head of Government while the ceremonial President was Head of State. This system had in-built checks and balances, which ensured that the Prime Minister was accountable to Parliament and also attended Parliament to answer questions from the opposition. However, Mugabe and the other nationalists had preferred a presidential system, as opposed to the Westminster system, which they accepted with reluctance at the Lancaster House talks.
Constitutional Amendment No. 7 was the legal instrument that changed the system, putting into place the executive presidential system that the nationalists had always favoured. Edison Zvobgo, the ZANU PF legal supremo is often credited with crafting this monstrous amendment, but Mugabe was the real architect because it is what he preferred from the start. Zvobgo obliged and some argue that he was happy to do the job because he believed it would serve him well as he had ambitions to succeed Mugabe, a chance that eluded him until his death in 2004. This Executive Presidency combined the powers of the former Prime Minister and the ceremonial duties of the former President. Significantly, Amendment No. 7 was crafted at the same time that ZANU PF and PF ZAPU were negotiating their political agreement, which was confirmed as the Unity Accord. The Unity Accord was signed on 22 December 1987 and Amendment No. 7 became law just nine days later on 31 December 1987. Both were parts of the political jigsaw aimed at consolidating power in the hands of Mugabe and ZANU PF.
What emerged was a monstrosity that wielded excessive powers over the entire state and dominated the political landscape. To use terminology that is more common these days, it was the legal cementation of the principle of the One Centre of Power. Mugabe became the personification of the Zimbabwean government, which henceforth was built around his personality and image. If the story of Zimbabwe reads like a book on dictatorship, then Amendment No. 7 was the chapter which provided the perfect legal framework. So powerful was the legacy of Amendment No. 7 that when people began to write the new Constitution adopted in 2013, the starting point was whether or not to retain the Executive Presidency. While efforts were made to trim down the powers, experience in the first three years of the Constitution demonstrate that old habits die hard. For example, the President has no business opening Parliament, but it’s an expensive and unnecessary ritual that persists.
Willowgate and the Sandura Commission (1988-89)
In 1988, a scandal of enormous proportions was revealed in a sensational story by The Chronicle, a Bulawayo-based newspaper then edited by Geoff Nyarota. It was a case of grand corruption which involved Government Ministers and senior civil servants and businessmen abusing a state facility of importing motor vehicles for resale at inflated prices. In those years, the motor vehicle sales market was severely restricted and there was a shortage of cars, leading to long queues. Ministers had access to a Government facility to import cars. They would then sell them on to a desperate market at high prices, pocketing the proceeds. The corruption scandal led to anti-corruption demonstrations at the University of Zimbabwe, the student body showing its voice in a manner that had never been done before. Ironically, the government crushed this anti-corruption demonstration, showing signs of intolerance to collective action.
The Government set up a commission of enquiry chaired by a High Court, Justice Wilson Sandura. The Sandura Commission meticulously investigated the scandal and revealed serious acts of corruption. Some of the witnesses, including Government Ministers had given false evidence, leading to charges of perjury. One Minister, Frederick Shava, was later convicted of perjury, for lying to the commission under oath. Other Ministers were sacked while one, Maurice Nyagumbo, a veteran nationalist, allegedly committed suicide. The episode showed clear signs of decay only a few years after independence. While the Sandura Commission might have shown Government’s willingness to investigate and punish offenders for corruption, it also demonstrated Government’s weaknesses in that it failed to actually take stern action against offenders. Apart from those who left Government, there were no criminal prosecutions of note. Shava, the Minister who was convicted of perjury was given a reprieve after only one night in custody, after he was pardoned. The Attorney General ended up dropping cases against other Ministers. Shava himselfwas later rehabilitated and is presently Zimbabwe’s representative at the United Nations, after previously serving as Zimbabwe’s ambassador to China.
There were thus positive and negative signs in that episode. It has been argued by some that the whole event was used to get rid of veteran nationalists like Nyagumbo, who would have been serious contenders for power in future years. It has also been said that the Willowgate Scandal was hitting closer to the President’s own territory, and a planned Sandura Commission Part 2 was eventually dropped. In the final analysis, when the history of corruption in Zimbabwe is written, the Sandura Commission remains a defining moment. It showed a Government that was keen to put on a public show, but which ultimately was not prepared to apply the necessary powers to punish offenders. This would set the tone for future corruption scandals. High profile offenders often get away with it. The War Victims Compensation Fund was looted, there were many serious offenders but again nothing happened to them. There was also the Housing Loan Scandal, where senior government officials abused a state facility to build houses for civil servants. Again, nothing happened to the culprits. If the Government had dealt more decisively with the culprits identified by the Sandura Commission, it might have sent an early message about zero tolerance towards corruption. In the end, the whole process was a charade which yielded nothing except the reassuring political elites that they could steal and engage in corruption but the system would protect them. It is not surprising that corruption has become endemic in Zimbabwe.
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)
After the dalliance with socialist rhetoric in the first ten years of independence, in 1990-1, Mugabe reluctantly adopted the neo-liberal package of economic reforms from the Bretton-Woods institutions. The IMF/World Bank prescription was called the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Mugabe was a reluctant customer, but at the time, he had little choice. However, a half-hearted approach affected implementation. ESAP required a lot that went against what a populist Mugabe preferred. It emphasised the centrality of the free market, economic liberalisation and deregulation, privatisation and reduction in state involvement in the economy, and cuts in social services, such as health and education. It also required reductions in the civil service, which meant retrenchments in the public sector. Retrenchments were also common-place in the private sector, albeit with safety mechanisms to cushion workers. Government urged workers to tighten their belts, but the unions reacted strongly against the neo-liberal policies.
At the same time, the trade unions, students and civil society began to challenge the State in more fundamental ways. University and college students were at the forefront as the government began to whittle down the grants it was giving to students. Most people who had hitherto backed government began to lose faith in it. Nascent civil society groups and churches started to organise and challenge the state to reform the system of governance. One of the most important effects of ESAP was the creation of a huge reservoir of discontent within the working class and students’ communities. This was the beginning of new forms of opposition against ZANU PF, which finally culminated in the formation of the MDC, built as it was around the nucleus of labour unions, students, the women’s movement and other civil society groups.
By the end of the decade, government had abandoned ESAP, but it was too late. In 1998 widespread riots in Harare and other major cities demonstrated that people were getting agitated and militant. It was an economic experiment carried out by a reluctant partner and ended up in utter failure. By the end of the decade, the relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions had broken down, thanks to Government’s failure to service its debts, among other challenges.
The War Vets’ Pay-outs, Crash of the Zimbabwe Dollar and riots
November 14th 1997 is regarded by Zimbabweans as “Black Friday”. This was the day when the Zimbabwe Dollar crashed to what was then a record low against major currencies. It lost nearly 72% of its value against the US Dollar and the stock market crashed by 46% as investors scurried for cover. It was a downward spiral of decline from which the Zimbabwe Dollar would never recover. What exactly caused Black Friday is the subject of debate but fingers are usually pointed to the unbudgeted payments of huge pay-outs to veterans of the liberation war. Led by the combative Chenjerai Hunzvi, the war veterans protested against alleged neglect by the government. The War Veterans Association had been formed in 1990, following rising concerns that the leadership had abandoned them as they enjoyed life on the gravy train. During that year, a commission of enquiry chaired by Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku had probed corruption and abuse of the War Victims Compensation Fund, a fund that had been established to support veterans of the struggle. It found that the leaders had corruptly used their positions to loot the fund. Most of this money was never recovered.
Under Hunzvi’s leadership the war veterans became more militant. They demonstrated their power when they booed Mugabe and drowned his speech at a public event at the National Heroes Acre. Mugabe was not used to such public humiliation. It shocked him into an impulsive reaction. He immediately met the leadership of the war veterans and acceded to their demands. Approximately 60,000 war veterans were granted ZWD 50,000 each as lump-sum payments plus a monthly pension and school fees for their children. The Zimbabwe dollar was still good money. These huge payments had not been budgeted for and government likely printed money to meet the demand. It raised the budget deficit in 1997 by 55% from the previous year. This transaction caused a sharp response from the Bretton-Woods institutions which were underwriting ESAP. In September 1997, the World Bank temporarily withdrew the USD62.5 million standing credit line meant for the balance of payments support, citing questions over the budget deficit caused by the pay-outs. When Government tried to cover the deficit by imposing a tax, this was met by a series of protests across the country. The crash of the Zimbabwe dollar in the foreign exchange markets was reflected in the loss of its value on the domestic markets which spawned an upsurge in prices of goods and services and a loss in wages. Overnight, consumer prices rose by 25%.
This resulted in collective action led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, then under the leadership of Gibson Sibanda and Morgan Tsvangirai. This assumed a political dimension which prompted a stern response from the government, which would define the future. After the workers’ riots, Mugabe challenged Tsvangirai and union leaders to join politics. They responded to that call by forming the MDC in 1999. The events of November 1997 marked an important step in the ever-running story of Zimbabwe’s economic collapse.
Constitutional movement and the 2000 Referendum
On 12 and 13 February 2000, there was a national referendum on the adoption of a new constitution for Zimbabwe. A Constitutional Commission chaired by the then Judge President Godfrey Chidyausiku was set up in 1999 under the Commission of Inquiries Act to spearhead the writing for a new constitution to replace the Lancaster House Constitution negotiated in 1979 to end the war and bring independence. The push for a new Constitution had been initiated by civil society through the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a broad platform bringing together various stakeholders. However, the NCA rejected the government-led process, arguing, among other things, that the process was not people driven. The government campaigned for a “yes” vote, while the NCA and its political ally, the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change campaigned for a “no” vote. The new constitution was rejected by 54.31% to 45.69% of the votes.
It was the first major electoral defeat for ZANU PF and it was celebrated in opposition circles. Many saw it as the precursor to ZANU PF’s defeat in parliamentary elections, which were due the same year. However, with the benefit of hindsight, many rue the referendum as the moment that saved ZANU PF as it demonstrated the real danger of defeat and loss of political power. Realising the impending danger, ZANU PF immediately regrouped and re-strategised with a view to prevent defeat in the general election. There is an argument that if the elections had taken place without the referendum, ZANU PF would have been defeated. Nevertheless, this argument also overlooks the figures which show that 6 of the 10 provinces voted in favour of ZANU PF’s “yes” campaign. Only 4, Harare, Bulawayo, Manicaland and Matabeleland North voted “no”. The major strongholds, the 3 Mashonaland provinces and Masvingo, voted for ZANU PF’s “yes” campaign. The “no” vote benefited from the very high turnout in the urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo and the relatively lower turnout in the rural areas.
Also with the befit of hindsight, others rue the rejection of the constitution as a lost opportunity in which voters myopically voted against Mugabe and ZANU PF, at the expense of a constitution which contained provisions that could have saved Zimbabwe from a longer Mugabe presidency. The proposed constitution had term limits’ provisions which, if adopted, would have meant the maximum possible time until which Mugabe could have remained in office was 2010. The rejection delayed a new constitution, and new term limits to 2013 when a new Constitution was finally adopted. Nevertheless, this argument assumes that Mugabe and ZANU PF would have stuck to the Constitution. Given the current trend in African countries whereby serving leaders are amending the Constitution to extend term-limits, it is probable that Mugabe would have amended the Constitution to extend his stay in office.
Could the adoption of the Constitution have changed the course of political history in Zimbabwe? We will never know. Did the rejection affect the course of political history? It certainly shocked ZANU PF enough to take corrective and pre-emptive measures before the impending parliamentary elections. If the referendum had been the general election, it is probable, though not certain that ZANU PF would have been defeated.
Land Revolution
This is not an event but a process, which had a fundamental effect on the economy and politics of Zimbabwe. When the history of Zimbabwe is written, the events on the agricultural farms after 2000 will more accurately be described as a revolution. This is so because what happened completely changed the agricultural landscape, with the institution of private ownership of agricultural land having been dismantled and replaced by public ownership. There has been a fundamental transformation in the legal infrastructure relating to land ownership and occupation. The highly controversial process of land occupations led to the displacement of the bulk of the 4,500 farmers who owned commercial agricultural land across the country. This was carried out under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, which began after the failure of protracted negotiations between Zimbabwe and the former colonial power, the United Kingdom, to find a resolution to the land question.
The spark was the emergence of the MDC as a political force which threatened ZANU PF’s stranglehold on power. For Mugabe and the ruling party, the land question became an important rallying point for waning political support. While there had been sporadic land occupations by peasant farmers in areas near commercial farms, the spate of violent land invasions intensified after the constitutional referendum in February 2000, which the ZANU PF government lost. From then onwards, there was no stopping the ZANU PF juggernaut, with veterans of the liberation struggle and its supporters at the forefront. By 2010, the entire commercial agricultural landscape had been transformed, with vast tracts of land formerly owned by white farmers now in the hands of ZANU PF elites and thousands of peasant farmers. While the government had accused white farmers of holding on to multiple properties, the new system is a replication of the old to the extent that ZANU PF elites are also multiple farm owners. State support to farmers has been abused with equipment distributed under the Farm Mechanisation Scheme of 2007-08 not being paid for and the overall debt being passed on to the taxpayers.
Nevertheless, the land revolution came at a huge cost with levels of productivity falling drastically. A country that used to export excess food and other agricultural products is now a net importer, with most people in rural areas relying on humanitarian aid. The displacement of white farmers also led to the displacement of the hundreds of thousands of farmworkers. The ruralisation of commercial agricultural land has also affected electoral constituencies, with new settlements forming important voting blocs differing fundamentally from the pre-occupations situation.
Apart from political violence and election rigging, the land revolution was one of the principal reasons that made Zimbabwe a pariah state. The decimation of property rights are a cardinal offence which threatened an important pillar of a liberal economic ideology. Relations with Western nations, particularly the US, UK and the EU broke down, leading to a set of targeted sanctions against the ZANU PF leadership and related corporate entities. However, the imposition of these restrictions also had a fundamental effect on the conduct of Zimbabwean politics as ZANU PF seized upon them to advance the argument that they were unfairly targeted by regime-change agents. Mugabe and ZANU PF have always argued that they were punished for daring to take land from the white farmers. Fellow African leaders have sympathised with Mugabe on this account, leading them to condone his excesses against political opponents. The ‘sanctions’ mantra became a major campaign tool for ZANU PF and has been used as an excuse for economic failure.
The land revolution also had a big impact on the judicial arm of the state. The ZANU PF government did not trust the judiciary led by Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay. They believed the white judges sympathised with the beleaguered white farmers from whom land was being forcibly taken. The fact that the judges were interpreting the law which clearly protected the rights of existing landowners did not matter. The government decided to force out the judges. The war veterans, led by Joseph Chinotimba led the charge, on one occasion invading the Supreme Court building and dancing on the furniture, threatening judges. Patrick Chinamasa, then the Minister of Justice carried the government message to Chief Justice Gubbay, stating that they could no longer guarantee their safety. Left in a state of vulnerability, the judges eventually left the bench. They were replaced by judges whom the government believed were politically correct. Soon after the judges began to rule in favour of government in the land matters. This episode had a fundamental impact on executive/judiciary relations, ensuring that for the future, the judiciary was well and truly captured by the executive and by the ruling party, a situation that continues to prevail to this day.
Furthermore, the land revolution has had an important effect on Zimbabwe’s agrarian economy. A large part of the manufacturing sector also relied on the agricultural sector and those industries are struggling under the burden of failure. All this has also impacted negatively upon the economy and government’s ability to deliver social services. This economic burden has been a perennial albatross for ZANU PF, leading observers to argue that the economy is its number one opponent.
2005 MDC Split
In September 2005, the six-year old opposition party, the MDC, which had taken the political landscape by storm went through its first major split. It had grown very quickly to become the biggest opposition party in Zimbabwe after years of dominance by ZANU PF. Apart from the challenge posed by Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the 1990 general election, and Margaret Dongo’s audacious challenge in the 1995 parliamentary election, the 1990s had been relatively quiet on the political front, with ZANU PF dominating parliament. The emergence of the MDC, a conglomeration of different interest groups, did much to shake the political scene. However, there were deep-seated tensions within the young party, which reached breaking point in September 2005 over a decision on whether or not to participate in the Senate elections. ZANU PF had used its two thirds parliamentary majority to amend the Constitution, re-introducing the Senate, which had been abolished 15 years earlier. One faction was against participating in the impending election to fill the Senate vacancies while another faction favoured participation. This dispute was the spark that ignited the fire in the MDC and led to two major factions – the larger group remained loyal to Morgan Tsvangirai and adopted the name MDC-T to distinguish it from the smaller group that went with Welshman Ncube.
After the split, the MDC was never the same again. Although the MDC-T won the 2008 general election and Tsvangirai defeated Mugabe, the margins could have been higher had the two MDC formations worked as one unit. They lost some constituencies even though their combined votes were more than the ZANU PF candidates’ votes. The MDC led by Arthur Mutambara did not back Morgan Tsvangirai in the 2008 elections, choosing instead to back Simba Makoni who had left ZANU PF a few months before the election. In negotiations for political reforms, the MDC formations acted as separate units. After the failed election of 27 June 2008, the parties negotiated the Global Political Agreement as separate entities. In some ways, the smaller MDC played an important balancing role between ZANU PF and the MDC-T. This role was certainly evident during the constitution-making process, where the two main parties were often at logger-heads. It was the smaller MDC which played the mediator and broke the tensions.
The significance of the 2005 split is that it set a bad precedent which has dogged the MDC for years. After the 2013 elections, the party experienced yet another split much along similar lines as the original split. The splits have resulted in multiple opposition parties and caused disillusionment among sections of voters.
11 March 2007
The events of 11 March 2007 did much to affect the course of political history in Zimbabwe. It was the day when state agents savagely beat up MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and fellow political and civil society activists when they were on their way to a prayer gathering. In the months preceding that, Zimbabwe had been low on the international radar and SADC was under criticism for its lethargic approach to the crisis in the country. The horrific images of Tsvangirai, Sekai Holland, Grace Kwinjeh, Lovemore Madhuku which went around the world and the killing of Gift Tandare changed all that. Mugabe did not help his cause when he appeared to gloat over the inhuman and cruel treatment of Tsvangirai of whom he stated derisively, “Chakadashurwa!” (He was deservingly beaten to a pulp). Far from being a moment of celebration for Mugabe, the beating of Tsvangirai increased the cost of his leadership and brought more attention and sympathy to his adversary. SADC was moved to quickly convene an Extraordinary Summit on 28-29 March 2007 to discuss the escalating crisis in Zimbabwe. Although the communique did not refer to the arrests and inhumane treatment of Tsvangirai and political activists, SADC formally appointed South Africa leader, President Thabo Mbeki, to mediate between the political parties. It was this process that resulted in the Kariba Draft constitution, which was essentially an agreement between ZANU PF and the two MDC parties. It was designed to usher a new legal framework of governance before the next elections. Eventually, ZANU PF reneged and only enacted limited reforms under Amendment No. 18. It was also the same process that resulted in a limited amount of electoral reforms.
The significance of 11 March is that violence actually worked against Mugabe and ZANU PF. Instead of silencing the opposition, it brought more attention and sympathy to Tsvangirai and the MDC. This sympathy factor would have an important role in the run-up to the 29 March 2008 election. SADC countries that had hitherto down-played the Zimbabwean crisis, had no choice but to take a more active and hands on role. The events of 11 March and the international coverage they received ensured that events in Zimbabwe could no longer be ignored, even by its African peers.
Global Political Agreement and Inclusive Government
The 2008 elections were an abject failure, resulting in a political stalemate that required mediation by SADC, through the agency of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The result of the negotiations was a Global Political Agreement under which the Inclusive Government was consummated. The GPA was an unlikely marriage between hostile parties. It restored legitimacy to a government which had suffered badly after the violence leading up to the 27 June elections. Mugabe had lost elections for the first time but the winner, Tsvangirai was deemed not to have acquired the required minimum number of votes to become President outright. However, the inordinate delay in announcing presidential election results tainted an otherwise peaceful first round of elections. A presidential run-off election had to be held and it was during this period that at least 200 opposition supporters lost their lives due to state-sponsored violence.
The GPA was a product of political compromise but it also showed ZANU PF’s intransigence and stubborn refusal to give up power. Most observers believe Tsvangirai won the 29 March elections but was robbed after ZEC withheld results for 6 weeks during which manipulation took place to save Mugabe’s presidency. If that manipulation and the violence had not been deployed, Mugabe might well have been defeated at the run-off election and Zimbabwe’s course of history might well have turned out differently. Instead, the SADC-brokered deal resulted in an Inclusive Government, with Mugabe retaining the Presidency and Tsvangirai becoming the Prime Minister.
The GPA showed that when it comes to crucial political decisions, politics leads and law follows. The GPA was concluded first and the Constitution was amended later to reflect the political reality.
Some observers believe that the biggest beneficiary of the GPA was ZANU PF, which used the period to recover and regroup after the disaster of the 2008 elections. For the opposition, the Inclusive Government gave them experience in government, but it also exposed them to ZANU PF’s message of “equalisation”, by which it pointed out that the MDCs were really no different from ZANU PF. The corruption in MDC-run local councils dented the opposition’s reputation. It could have been a period of reforms but a combination of the opposition’s lethargy and ZANU PF’s stubbornness stifled the reform agenda. While the economy recovered and stabilised during that period, political and electoral reforms stalled. Not even the adoption of the new Constitution provided the momentum for reforms.
By the time the Inclusive Government ended, ZANU PF was highly confident, hurrying everyone into an election for which it was sufficiently prepared but they were not. The MDCs claimed credit for the economic success of the Inclusive Government, but they failed to achieve the political reforms they wanted. The GPA gave a lifeline to ZANU PF and became a trap for the opposition parties.
2013 elections
The 2013 elections were supposed to be a watershed moment for Zimbabwe. The opposition parties were in a buoyant mood after a strong performance during the Inclusive Government. They hoped to benefit from the credit of the strong economic performance after a disastrous economic tenure under the sole leadership of ZANU PF before the GPA. Back then in 2008 hyperinflation reached record levels of 231 million per cent. Local currency was abandoned as the country adopted a multi-currency regime. Under the Inclusive Government the economy stabilised.
However, as there were no serious political and electoral reforms, the political environment remained largely the same as before. Apart from violence which had characterised previous elections, ZANU PF retained its traditional hold on state institutions and the advantages that flow from it. The opposition parties sensed the danger of being rushed into an election without reforms and tried hard to resist and delay the elections. However, these efforts were in vain. Even a last minute Extraordinary Summit of SADC failed to stop the elections. The opposition parties could have withheld their participation in that election citing lack of reforms. This would have been perfectly understood by SADC and the rest of the world. However, the opposition threw caution to the wind and trusted that if people came out to vote in their numbers, they could overwhelm the vote rigging systems. As it turned out, this was too optimistic and ZANU PF had played its game perfectly to ensure a massive result in their favour.
In the end, there was huge disappointment as the results were announced showing an unbelievably big win for ZANU PF. All the efforts that had been invested and the hopes for the future collapsed. ZANU PF rode on the success of the Inclusive Government in the first two years. However, soon the cost of a stolen election began to show. Barely three years after the 2013 elections, Zimbabwe is almost where it was in 2008, with an economic teetering on the brink of collapse. Politically, the 2013 result also affected the opposition negatively. The defeat brought frustration, disappointment, despair and tensions among the leadership of the MDC-T. The squabbles resulted in a complete breakdown in relationships and a second major split in the party.
Zimbabwe might well have taken a different route post-2013 if the opposition had won. But that was not to be. ZANU PF prevailed. The impasse with the West has continued and the Look East policy has not yielded much. Zimbabwe under an alternative leadership would certainly have adopted a different approach in its international relations and economic policies. For a start it’s unlikely that the MDC-T would have split. No doubt, the controversial outcome of the 2013 elections has had a fundamental effect on the course of Zimbabwean politics.
Conclusion
This list is by no means complete and exhaustive. It is possible that someone could come up with an entirely different list of key moments that have shaped the political history of Zimbabwe up to now. There is the “DRC Misadventure” for example, a pointless war from which Zimbabwe gained nothing except enriching the pockets of political and military elites. It impacted heavily on the country’s national resources, creating an unnecessary burden from which there has been no recovery. However, I thought, after discussing many of the specific issues relating to current politics, it might be useful to have a broader, panoramic view of the moments that I think have been fundamental. The broader project is to do a landmarks of Zimbabwean history, going back to 1890, to understand more widely the moments, events and processes that have shaped Zimbabwean political history since the earliest days.
waMagaisa
