“We have not received much from the diamond industry at all. I don’t think we have exceeded $2 billion yet we think more than $15 billion has been earned … Lots of smuggling and swindling has taken place and the companies that have been mining, I want to say robbed us of our wealth.â€
These were the words of President Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s ruler for 36 years. He was speaking to the ZBC, the national broadcaster on the occasion to mark his 92nd birthday http://www.herald.co.zw/miners-robbed-us-says-president/  Mugabe was complaining about the plunder of Zimbabwe’s diamond fields in Chiadzwa, first mined commercially less than a decade ago.
Blameless by-stander?
Listening to him moaning over the looting of diamonds, you would think he was a helpless by-stander. But he is the head of state and government, the man ultimately responsible for the management of the country’s resources. He has the powers to prevent the looting and to ensure looters are brought to book. Yet he narrates it so casually and pitifully as if it were just another story of loss over which he is helpless and blameless.
He blames the Chinese companies which his government gave generous freedom to operate in the Chiadzwa diamond fields. The Chinese enjoyed preferential treatment over Western companies, thanks frosty relations between Mugabe and the West, which led Mugabe to adopt a Look East policy. Awarding mining rights to Chinese companies ahead of their Western counterparts was in part, to spite the West and a form of retaliation for what he regarded as unfair ill-treatment by the Western. Now though, Mugabe seems to have come to a late realisation that unless you remain vigilant, anyone can exploit you. The Chinese that he trusted so much are only the latest to take advantage of the leadership’s gullibility.
Early warnings
It’s odd to hear Mugabe complaining now because for years his government has ignored civil society activists who have raised red flags over the Chiadzwa diamonds, highlighting the corruption and human rights violations that have been taken place over the years. Among them are Human Rights Watch, Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness, also a Canadian civil society group. In Zimbabwe Farai Maguwu’s Centre for Research and Development has been at the forefront on this issue. These groups have been consistently monitoring developments in Chiadzwa and reporting regularly on the problems around the diamond mining industry in Zimbabwe (see for example: http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/18_Zimbabwe-Diamonds_March09-Eng.pdf)
However, they have either been ignored or dismissed as Western organisations interfering in Zimbabwe’s affairs and bent on stifling trade in the country’s diamonds. Yet all that they have been highlighting about the corruption and plunder at Chiadzwa is now being confirmed by Mugabe’s own admission (see also https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/zimbabwe/ )
As Finance Minister, Tendai Biti constantly complained about the failure of the diamond industry to contribute adequately to the national coffers. In 2012, Biti expected a minimum of $600 million from the diamond industry but only received a paltry $43 million. The diamond industry was shrouded in secrecy. There was a parallel economy funded by the diamond industry and benefitting political elites, most of them connected to Zanu PF. When Biti protested against the haemorrhage in the diamond fields, Mugabe took no notice. The plunder was going on right under his watch, and he was warned several times, and yet today he moans that “We have not received much from the diamond industry at allâ€. His own Finance Minister, Patrick Chinamasa does not even bank on receipts from diamond mining anymore.
In 2013, as he campaigned for re-election, he was presented with a $10 million dummy cheque by his then indigenisation minister Saviour Kasukuwere. It was representing funds pledged by the diamond mining companies as their contributions to the local community development trust. But just a year later, the companies were denying that they had ever made those pledges. Yet despite having been hoodwinked, Mugabe did nothing about it.
In 2013, Edward Chindori-Chininga, an MP chaired the parliamentary committee on mining and energy which carried out an extensive investigation into the diamond industry. A week after presenting a report which exposed the corruption that was going on in the diamond fields, Chindori-Chininga was killed in a car crash. Many people suspect he was murdered. One of the committee’s findings was that there were serious discrepancies between what the diamond firms claimed to have paid in taxes and what the national revenue authorities had actually received.
Now, in his latest interview, Mugabe complained that the locals whom government appointed to look after its interests had done a poor job as gate-keepers. Instead, what he called the “eyes and ears†of government had also been complicit in the corruption. He spoke of this as if it were a new discovery, yet a person in his position, with full access to information and all these reports should have long-known that there was something seriously wrong going on in the diamond industry.
Corruption as life-blood of “The Systemâ€
Yet, while acknowledging the corruption, plunder and looting of diamonds, Mugabe didn’t seem to offer a recovery plan, except to order the nationalisation of the diamond mines. But looking at the history of corruption in Zimbabwe, it is not altogether surprising that there is little, if any, appetite to deal decisively with corruption. Corruption, along with patronage and nepotism provide the life-blood that sustains “The System†in Zimbabwe, which represents the totality of structures, processes and human agents that make up the ruling establishment. I have previously analysed The System here: https://alexmagaisa.com/understanding-the-system-in-zimbabwean-politics/
An historical assessment of corruption in Zimbabwe demonstrates that for Mugabe corruption is a potent political tool. Mugabe knows people around him are corrupt. He knows the State presents vast rent-seeking opportunities, which his subordinates cannot resist. It becomes both a trap and a sword that he can use in managing power.
Firstly, his subordinates become so comfortable on the gravy train that they have every incentive to stay. Their lives and businesses are entirely dependent on their relationship with the State and the party. Corruption feeds the system and in order to continue enjoying the benefits, they will keep away from challenging him. And they will fight to the death to defend the system. This is why it’s very rare for anyone to leave ZANU PF voluntarily. The vast majority have to be pushed, often kicking and screaming because departure entails a huge loss of rent-seeking opportunities.
Secondly, for Mugabe, corruption is an instrument of control. It is allowed to flourish in order to trap those who benefit from it. As his former deputy, Joice Mujuru told the British Sunday Times recently, “He [Mugabe] keeps files on everybodyâ€. These files contain all their corrupt dealings. They are threats against those who dare challenge him. In true Machiavellian fashion, by not prosecuting corrupt subordinates, Mugabe appears as the virtuous, kind and compassionate ruler – this attracts loyalty and devotion from them. But he will occasionally deploy his other side, sacrificing a few, more as a reminder of his power, that a true commitment to eradicate the scourge of corruption.
The following selected corruption scandals demonstrate how Mugabe has employed corruption as a tool of political utility:
Paweni Scandal
Samson Bernard Mashata Paweni was a businessman who operated in the transport industry in the 1980s. He had lived in exile in Zambia during the liberation war, where he grew his transport business. Zimbabwe experienced a prolonged drought in the early 1980s, which caused widespread foot shortages. Humanitarian aid was mobilised to provide food assistance to the people. On the back of his close relationships with the new political elites in Harare in the early years of independence, Paweni’s company won the tender for the transportation of maize to drought-affected areas.
This assignment was blighted by huge fraudulent claims that were made by Paweni and his associates. The government lost nearly $6 million, at a time when the local currency was still very strong. Kumbirai Kangai, who was the social welfare minister at the time and officials at the ministry were implicated as beneficiaries in the scandal. However, only Paweni, his associate and ministry officials were prosecuted and convicted for bribery. Paweni was initially sentenced to 15 years imprisonment with hard labour, but this was later reduced to 10 years on appeal to the Supreme Court.
Thus although the minister, Kangai was implicated in what was the biggest corruption scandal at the time, he was never prosecuted. Instead, he was appointed to various ministries in Mugabe’s government. This was the first indication that Mugabe did not have the will or seriousness to tackle corruption among the political elites. He was prepared to protect the elites in exchange for their loyalty. How could Kangai rebel against his boss who had shown him such benevolence and kindness? But true to form, Kangai would later be involved in another serious scandal when as agriculture minister in 1997 he presided over an ill-advised and dubious sale of the country’s grain when Zimbabwe was facing maize shortages. The country ended up importing maize from South Africa at a time when it was exporting to Malawi and Zambia at a lower price!
Willowgate Scandal
The Willowgate scandal broke out in 1988, when The Chronicle newspaper revealed massive corruption that was taking place around the state-owned motor vehicle assembly company, Willowvale Motor Industries (WMI). Mugabe appointed a commission of enquiry headed by Justice Wilson Sandura, a judge of the High Court. It became famously known as the Sandura Commission. Its purpose was to investigate corruption at WMI, which involved the acquisition and re-sale at inflated prices of motor vehicles from the company.
Younger Zimbabweans growing up in an age when Zimbabwe’s pot-holed roads are forever congested with thousands of cheap second-hand Japanese imports may find it hard to appreciate the problem of accessing motor vehicles in the 1980s. At the time, there was very limited access to new motor vehicles mainly due to strict exchange control regulations. Buying a new motor vehicle was a cumbersome process and there were long waiting queues of buyers. The shortage created high demand and rent-seeking opportunities for those who had privileged access to motor vehicles. Some ministers and senior government officials and their associates who had access to motor vehicles took advantage of these rent-seeking opportunities.
The Sandura Commission unearthed huge levels of corruption involving these political elites. They would acquire vehicles from WMI at preferential rates and re-sell them at grossly inflated rates to desperate buyers, making huge profits in the process. Political elites who were caught up in the scandal included Enos Nkala, Maurice Nyagumbo, Dzingai Mtumbuka, Frederick Shava, Jacob Mudenda and several others. It also emerged that several of these had perjured themselves when they gave false evidence to the commission. Some resigned while others were sacked by Mugabe. Nyagumbo died after allegedly drinking a lethal pesticide. One narrative suggests that the humiliation proved too much for Nyagumbo. But another narrative, conveyed by his old comrade Edgar Tekere is that Nyagumbo felt let down by Mugabe who had earlier refused his resignation but later called him to demand that he should resign. For Tekere, it was the feeling of betrayal that drove him to suicide.
The virtuous leader
Nevertheless, the effect of the Sandura Commission was undermined by the leniency extended by Mugabe to those who had committed corruption. This emblematic case in this regard was that of Frederick Shava: a senior minister who lied to the commission and was convicted of perjury and sent to prison but was immediately pardoned by Mugabe. He spent just one might in prison before Mugabe pardoned him. “Who amongst us has not lied? Yesterday you were with your girlfriend and you told your wife that you were with the President. Should you get nine months for that?†Mugabe is quoted as having said as justification for Shava’s pardon.
Apart from securing the release of Shava, the pardon had a collateral effect: the Attorney-General, Patrick Chinamasa, who would have prosecuted other political elites who had also lied to the commission had to drop those criminal prosecutions as it was a futile exercise in the face of Shava’s pardon. It also created a moral hazard: Ministers and senior politicians could lie under oath and get away with it.
This was classic Mugabe playing the kind and compassionate leader to his fellow comrades. But the long-term effect was more devastating: it demonstrated that Mugabe did not take corruption seriously and that transgressors would receive lenient treatment. This lax approach to corruption created another moral hazard as it suggested that political elites could engage in corrupt practices and get away with it. It also meant one law for the political elites and another for the ordinary citizens.
But for Mugabe the pardon was an important tool of control: Shava and other beneficiaries would forever be grateful and beholden to Mugabe. They would not challenge him in future. He had saved them. While Mtumbuka quit politics and went on to have a thriving career as an international civil servant, Shava was gradually rehabilitated and brought back into the fold. He became chairman of Zanu PF in the Midlands province, before he was posted to China as the country’s ambassador. Two years ago, he was transferred to New York, where he is Zimbabwe’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Such a man would never challenge Mugabe. Unsurprisingly, Mugabe has typically used this approach of showing benevolence in the face of corruption as a way of creating a pool of loyalty and subservience.
Eliminating rivals?
Others have been more cynical about the true purpose of the Sandura Commission, arguing that far from being a genuine effort at unearthing corruption, it was actually used as an opportunity by Mugabe to get rid of or to control his political rivals. Nkala and Nyagumbo were his most senior peers from the liberation struggle: Nkala claimed the distinction that ZANU’s formation was announced from his Highfield home in Harare. Nyagumbo was a highly respected and popular politician who had nearly toppled Mugabe’s then deputy, Simon Muzenda for the vice presidency of the party at the 1984 Congress. It is said Mugabe had stepped in to persuade Nyagumbo to step aside for Muzenda, despite having gained more nominations from the provinces. The elimination of Nkala and Nyagumbo via the Sandura Commission is regarded by some critics as confirmation that it was a political tool in managing power.
This theory appears to get support from the fact that a second Sandura Commission, which would have dug deeper into the issues of corruption, and had been proposed was never established in the end. Apparently, Nyagumbo had threatened to reveal more dirt on the scandal which would have been embarrassing to the leadership.
The reward for Geoff Nyarota, the Chronicle editor who had broken the big story was a dubious promotion which was effectively way of removing him from his role and preventing further revelations through the paper. The message was clear: those who expose corruption are more at risk than those who are implicated in corruption. Ironically, a key whistle-blower in the Willowgate scandal was Obert Mpofu, now a fabulously wealthy politician who source of income is believed by some to be dubious. He was Minister of Mines at the height of the diamond boom in Zimbabwe and was named by a parliamentary committee has having stuffed the ministry’s boards with friends and relatives.
The War Victims Compensation Fund
The Government established a War Victims Compensation Fund (WVCF) under the War Victims Compensation Act, primarily designed to provide compensation to victims who had suffered injuries during the liberation struggle. However, this fund was looted by political elites. A commission of enquiry was set up under the chairmanship of High Court judge, Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku. The commission’s investigations revealed that political elites had made false and fraudulent claims based on fake injuries and irregular medical examinations. At the centre of this huge fraud was Dr Chenjerai Hunzvi, who was the vocal Chairman of the War Veterans Association and had acted as the medical examiner for most of the claimants. Most of the injuries were exaggerated, leading to grossly inflated clams.  The vast majority of the looters were connected to Zanu PF.
Some of the notable false claims included Robin Shava, a former staff member of the national broadcaster, the ZBC who was awarded $483 535 on the basis of a 100% disability claim. Vivian Mwashita, a former intelligence operative who had contested elections for Zanu PF was awarded $579 091 on the basis of 94% disability certification. Oppah Muchinguri got $478 166 on the basis that she was 65% disabled. Joice Mujuru got $389 472 for a 55% disability claim. Reward Marufu, elder brother to First Lady Grace Mugabe, got $821 668  on the basis of a 95% disability claim while the Commissioner of  Police Augustine Chihuri got $138 664 on the grounds that he was 20% disabled.
However, not a single individual was prosecuted for these acts of fraud. In fact, Hunzvi went on to lead demands from ordinary war veterans for compensation packages, despite the fact that he had participated in the looting spree of the fund initially designed for his members. For Mugabe, war veterans were necessary allies in the war to retain power. They humiliated him at a function at the Heroes Acre in 1997. He immediately caved in to their demands, giving them huge pay-outs of $50,000 each in November 1997. Political elites who had looted the initial fund kept their places in the establishment. The Chidyausiku had been yet another pointless exercise; a sheer waste of time and taxpayers’ funds.
Back to the diamonds
These examples, which we might conveniently refer to as “case studies” reveal the following:
- Mugabe has never taken corruption seriously enough, and instead of minimising it, his attitude and conduct has encouraged corruption among political elites. They know they can get away with it, hence political elites are among the wealthiest people in the country;
- Corruption is a useful tool of political control – those who benefit from corruption prefer to keep their place on the gravy train, and to eat quietly, but if caught, Mugabe can appear as the compassionate and virtuous leader who pardons or saves them, but all this is also intended to ensure political control;
- Corruption is also a useful tool as it hangs as a sword of Damocles above the heads of subordinates and rivals – it is an important weapon and any attempt to challenge Mugabe will be met with swift action using corruption charges or threats of such charges. It is an important tool to eliminate political rivals;
- Corruption is the oil that keeps the engine of The System running. It funds their luxurious lifestyles, the election campaign machine, and ensures everyone is catered for, and for this reason corruption is a huge incentive to defend the system by whatever means necessary, hence the tough resistance to political reform, etc.
All these leads us to the question why Mugabe dropped the $15 billion bombshell concerning diamonds during his birthday interview. It wasn’t a mistake. Mugabe knew exactly what he was doing. He is updated daily on what happens in the country it’s unlikely that he would not have known what was happening in the diamonds fields. He probably has a list of all the suspects within his government and outside. But as we saw in last week’s article, Mugabe is a master of deception. He is merely feigning ignorance but the truth is he knows his targets. Sooner or later, a commission will be established or suspects will be named. This time, the issue is elimination of rivals through corruption charges.
Potential targets
In this regard, there are at least two targets: first, Joice Mujuru and her allies in the new Zimbabwe People First party. The Mujuru family has been involved in diamond mining, first at River Ranch and later at Chiadzwa. One of Mujuru’s daughters was once implicated in a gold smuggling syndicate. It is most likely that part of the $15 billion dollar loss will be pinned on her and her allies. The second group could be one of the factions in Zanu PF, probably the Mnangagwa faction which is opposed to G40 which has the First Lady as a key ally, if not leader. The security establishment was also heavily invested in the diamond mining industry. If Mugabe wants to get rid of some people, he might just open his files and advise them to quit or he will allow criminal prosecutions to follow, with the devastating consequences. This might be a clean way of eliminating potential successors.
The history of corruption explored in this piece, using only a few of otherwise numerous examples demonstrates that President Mugabe has never shown any seriousness in tackling corruption: the reason why this $15 billion diamonds issue has been raised is because the utility of corruption as a tool in managing politics and power has now become relevant – this time, as a way of managing succession and opposition politics.
It is highly unlikely that Zimbabwe will recover a penny of the $15 billion dollars allegedly lost in the diamond fraud and corruption. But recovery of lost funds was never the main issue of this revelation. The revelation is a deliberately crafted strategy designed to create outrage and to open the path for the elimination of rivals, both within the party and in the opposition.
waMagaisa
Not to be reproduced without the author’s permission: wamagaisa@gmail.com
